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APPLYING WAINWRIGHT V. SYKES TO STATE ALTERNATIVE
HOLDINGS AND SUMMARY AFFIRMANCES
INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia' rejected the proposition
that the doctrine of adequate and independent state procedural grounds2
1. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2. This doctrine limits federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court on direct review of a
state court decision will not review the state judgment if it rests on adequate and in-
dependent state grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Fox
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875). Justice Jackson speaking for the Court explained the
reasoning:
[The reason] is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly ad-
judge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to re-
vise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views
of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
It has been argued that the real rationale for the doctrine is that the federal question is
mooted by the existence of a state ground which will support thejudgment. J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 95 (2d ed. 1983); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
429-30 (1963). Whether this jurisdictional limit is statutory or constitutionally mandated
is not settled. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Pro-
posalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 188-89 & n.6. Compare Noai, 372
U.S. at 430 n.40 (expressing no opinion) with icL at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that it is constitutionally mandated).
A distinction has been made between procedural and substantive state grounds.
"While [this Court] has deferred to state substantive grounds so long as they are not
patently evasive of or discriminatory against federal rights, it has sometimes refused to
defer to state procedural grounds only because they made burdensome the vindication of
federal rights." Noia, 372 U.S. at 432; see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-48
(1965). But see Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 989 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Hill I]; Sandalow, supra, at 197-99; Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1054 (1977).
A state ground is adequate if it is sufficient in itself to maintain the judgment. See
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1893). However, not all state procedural grounds
are adequate to block consideration of the federal issue. See, e.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457
U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982) (default rule inconsistently applied cannot be invoked to bar
federal claim); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 301 (1964) (new rule of procedure
cannot be created to bar federal claim); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923)
("Whatever springes [sic] the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights
that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made,
is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."); see also Brinkerhof-Faris Trust
& Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680-82 (1930) (state procedural ground that is unconsti-
tutional is not adequate); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920)
(same). Whether the state procedural ground is adequate to block consideration of the
federal issue is a question of federal law which federal courts must decide. Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965); see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967); Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order of Nobles
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constituted a jurisdictional bar to federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions.3 The Court held that although an adequate and
independent state procedural ground blocked direct review by the
Supreme Court, federal habeas relief remained available.4 The Noia
Court further stated that lower federal courts may exercise their jurisdic-
tion to hear the petition of a prisoner who had lost the right to raise a
federal constitutional issue because of a procedural default, unless the
prisoner had "deliberately bypassed" the procedural rule.'
Subsequent to Noia, the Court limited the discretion of federal courts
to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction.6 Indeed, in a series of cases culmi-
of the Mystic Shrine v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1929); Ward v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920).
Professor Wright has summarized the cases of inadequate state grounds as follows:
If there is no fair and substantial support in the facts for the state court's ruling
on the state ground, the Supreme Court can disregard it. A new state rule
cannot be invented for the occasion in order to defeat the federal claim. It has
been said that if the state court's refusal to consider the merits of a case is based
on a rule "more properly deemed discretionary than jurisdictional" this does
not bar review in the Supreme Court. Even a state procedural rule of general
applicability may be thought not an adequate state ground if it is so strict that it
interferes unduly with the presentation of federal questions.
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 107, at 748-49 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234 (1969)).
To be independent the state court's decision must derive solely from state law. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983). If the state court holds that the federal
constitution compelled the result, that state ground is not independent. See id. at 1040-
41, 1043-44; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1940). See generally
16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure
§§ 4023-4025 (1977 and Supp. 1984). For a complete discussion of the doctrine of ade-
quate and independent state grounds, see generally id. at §§ 4019-4028.
3. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963). The grant of federal habeas jurisdic-
tion over persons in state custody is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). If the federal
court issues the habeas writ the state is required to retry the case or release the petitioner.
See C. Wright, supra note 2, § 53, at 332.
For discussions of the background, history and concerns involved in federal habeas
review of state court convictions, see generally C. Wright, supra note 2, § 53; L. Yackle,
Postconviction Remedies §§ 15-21 (1981 and Cum. Supp. 1985); Note, Federal Habeas
Corpus Review of State Forfeitures Resulting From Assigned Counsel's Refusal to Raise
Issues on Appeal, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 850, 850-52 & nn. 1-3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Habeas Corpus Review].
4. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99, 426-34 (1963).
5. See id. at 438. A deliberate bypass is "'an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938)). Errors of counsel committed after conviction without the defendant's
knowledge will not be visited upon the defendant. Id.; see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 517 (1972). Only when a defendant knowingly and intentionally abandons the right
has he deliberately bypassed the state procedure for vindicating that right. See Noia, 372
U.S. at 439. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 94 n. 1 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (courts have found deliberate bypass without intent of defendant). It has been ar-
gued that the deliberate bypass standard was never intended to be applied to errors
committed during trial; rather, it was limited to post-conviction decisions in which the
defendant participated. Id. at 91-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
[Vol. 531358
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nating in Wainwright v. Sykes7 the Court substantially limited the reach
of Noia.' In Sykes, the habeas petitioner had forfeited his right to raise a
federal constitutional claim in state court because he failed to object con-
temporaneously.9 The Supreme Court held that a federal habeas court
could review a petition involving a procedural default only when a de-
fendant could show cause for and prejudice arising from the default."0
536, 538-39, 541-42 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973); L Yackle,
supra note 3, § 21, at 102-03.
7. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See supra note 6.
8. See iL at 87-88 & n.12. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
9. See iL at 75, 86-87. Florida law required the defense to object at or prior to trial
to the erroneous admission of a confession or be deemed to have waived the objection.
See id. at 76 n.5, 86. The Sykes Court rejected the petitioner's contention that Florida did
not have a contemporaneous objection rule, stating that "Florida procedure did, consist-
ently with the United States Constitution, require that respondent's confession be chal-
lenged at trial or not at all." Id. at 86.
10. See id at 87. The Sykes rule provides that when a procedural default constitutes
an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to block direct Supreme Court re-
view, the petitioner must demonstrate cause for and prejudice arising from the default
before the reviewing court may disregard the default and entertain the claim on the mer-
its. Id. at 86-87; see Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2908 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128-29 (1982); L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 82 (1981); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitu-
tionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1050, 1059 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Hill II]. This limitation does not arise from the limited scope of the federal courts' juris-
diction. Rather, it is a discretionary limit on the exercise of that jurisdiction. See Reed v.
Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). The Supreme Court justifies this limit because
habeas corpus review is equitable in nature. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 438. The Sykes rule
places the burden of proving cause and prejudice on the habeas petitioner. See Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
However, the definition of cause and prejudice is not clear. The Sykes Court left the
definition to later cases. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
144 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984),
described some of the boundaries of the cause requirement, stating:
a defendant is bound by the tactical decisions of competent counsel. . . and
that defense counsel may not flout state procedures and then turn around and
seek refuge in federal court from the consequences of such conduct ....
On the other hand, the cause requirement may be satisfied under certain cir-
cumstances when a procedural failure is not attributable to an intentional deci-
sion by counsel made in pursuit of his client's interests.
Id. at 2909 (citations omitted).
Prejudice may be demonstrated by showing that no evidence, other than the challenged
evidence, supports the prisoner's conviction, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
172 (1982), and that the errors at trial "worked to his actual and substantial disadvan-
tage, infecting [the] entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 170 (em-
phasis in original). This prong may be a variation of the harmless error doctrine.
Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (on direct appellate review, state
has burden of proving the error was harmless) with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91
(1977) (habeas applicant has not shown cause and prejudice) and id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting similarity to harmless error).
Whatever the exact definition of cause and prejudice may be, it has been viewed as a
significant barrier to obtaining federal habeas review. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
144 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The barrier, however, may have been lowered some-
what by the Court's decision in Reed v. Ross, 104 S. CL 2901 (1984), which held that a
novel claim may satisfy the cause test. See id. at 2910.
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However, when a state court "forgives" the default and decides the case
solely on the constitutional issue, a federal court may freely entertain the
habeas petition."
In Sykes the state courts-trial and appellate-did not discuss the
merits of the petitioner's constitutional claim, because the claim was
never presented on direct review.2 The Supreme Court acknowledged
that, under the circumstances, the claim would have been barred by the
state procedural ground. 3 Since Sykes, lower federal courts have dis-
agreed over whether the cause and prejudice standard applies in the case
of alternative holdings, 4 in which the state court dismisses the peti-
tioner's federal claim due to a procedural default but also reaches and
dismisses the federal claim on the merits. Some courts have held that
despite the state court's procedural dismissal, Sykes does not apply if the
state court has also decided the merits of the federal constitutional
claim. 5 Others have held that Sykes applies if a procedural ground was
a substantial basis for the state court's decision.' 6 A third group has held
that Sykes applies whenever the state court finds a procedural default,
regardless of whether the merits of the claim were also reached.' 7
When a state court bases its decision on two independent holdings-
11. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 150-51 & nn.8-10, 154 (1979); Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485 n.4 (1977); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982). The state court in Partida v. State, 506 S.W.2d
209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) did not mention the possible procedural problem, but rather
discussed only the merits of the constitutional claim. See id. at 210-11.
12. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 & n.3 (1977).
13. See id. at 85-87. The Court further held that if the state court had relied on that
procedural ground, that reliance would have barred direct federal review. See id. at 86-
87.
14. See infra note 18 for a definition of alternative holdings.
15. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1034 & n.4 (11th Cir.), affd by
an evenly divided court, 708 F.2d 646 (11 th Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 715
F.2d 502 (1I1th Cir. 1983) (en banc), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 725 F.2d
1526 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2688 (1984), vacated on other grounds,
105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985); Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1981); Bradford
v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); Bagwell, ProceduralAspects of Prisoner
§ 1983 and § 2254 Cases in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 95 F.R.D. 435, 457 (1982).
The Eleventh Circuit presents a unique approach to this problem. In Dobbert v.
Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3591 (1984), the court
stated that an alternative holding is sufficient to trigger the Sykes rule. See id. at 1524.
Nevertheless, in a subsequent case the Eleventh Circuit held that Sykes did not bar re-
view, even though it recognized that the state court had made an alternative holding. See
Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031 (1 1th Cir.), aff'd by an evenly divided court, 708
F.2d 646 (11th Cir.) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir. 1983)
(en banc), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2688 (1984), vacated on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1158
(1985). The Darden court relied on the fact that the merits of the petitioner's claim was a
basis for the state court's decision. See id.
16. See Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131-32 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v.
Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1287 (1984); United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
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one procedural and one substantive, for example-the court's holding is
said to be in the alternative. 18 Because both holdings can independently
support the court's decision, 19 they each constitute binding precedent."0
However, if a court fails to state explicitly that its decision is based on
two independent holdings, a reviewing court might interpret the opinion
as resting on only one."'
Assume that the two possible grounds are A-the independent state
ground-and B-the federal constitutional ground. The reviewing court
can interpret the decision in three different ways. The first interpretation
is that A is the sole basis of the state court's decision and that B is dic-
tum.22 Under this interpretation, the state court's decision is not charac-
terized as an alternative holding because it rests only on A.23 In this
situation, it is generally agreed that Sykes applies.2 4 A second interpreta-
tion is that A and B each independently supports the state court's deci-
18. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 46-47, 49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1287 (1984). "Where the judgment is based upon two alternative grounds, one on the
merits and the other not on the merits, there is a decision on both grounds although
either alone would have been sufficient to support the judgment ... " Restatement of
Judgments § 49 comment c (1942).
If the judgment of the court of first instance was based upon two alternative
grounds, either of which would be sufficient to support the judgment, and the
appellate court holds that both of these grounds are sufficient, and accordingly
affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to both grounds in a subse-
quent action on a different cause of action.
If the appellate court determines that one of these grounds is sufficient but
that the other is not, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is
conclusive only as to the first ground.
If the appellate court determines that one of these grounds is sufficient and
refuses to consider whether or not the other ground is sufficient, and accord-
ingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive only as to the first
ground.
Id. at § 69 comment b (citation omitted).
An alternative holding should be distinguished from an alternative judgment. The al-
ternative holding results in a judgment. That judgment can also be in the alternative-
meaning that the party against whom the judgment was entered may satisfy that judg-
ment in one of several ways. See Kaybill Corp. v. Cherne, 24 Ill. App. 3d 309, 313-14,
315-16, 320 N.E.2d 598, 602-03, 604 (1974); Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wash. 2d 238,
251-52, 242 P.2d 1038, 1044, 1046 (1952); State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130, 133, 4 S.E.2d
440, 442 (1939).
The alternative holding disposes of one issue, but gives two reasons for that disposition.
See United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 439-40 (3rd Cir. 1982). For
example, a claim of constitutional immunity against the use of testimony could be dis-
missed exclusively on the merits or on a procedural basis, or on both grounds.
19. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984); R. Cross, Precedent in English Law 86-87 (3d ed. 1977). See supra note 18.
20. See United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); R.
Cross, supra note 19, at 41.
21. See R. Cross, supra note 19, at 87, 89.
22. See Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959). For a complete discussion of this
case, see Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 108-22 (1959).
23. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 117, 135 (1982); Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d
44, 48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984); United States ex rel. Veal v.
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DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982); United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky,
689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
Circuits that hold that a state court opinion must rest exclusively on the procedural
ground will apply the Sykes test when the state court merely discussed the federal consti-
tutional claim in dictum. See Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 777 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985); Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 475-76, 478 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). The Fifth Circuit has stated that the applicable
rule is that "if 'the state courts entertained the federal claims on the merits, a federal
habeas corpus court must also determine the merits of the applicant's claim.'" Ratcliff v.
Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (quoting Lefkowitz
v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 292 n.9 (1975)). Discussing the federal claim in dictum is not
equivalent to entertaining the federal claim on the merits. See infra note 36 and accom-
panying text. Indeed, the cases cited and discussed by the court in Ratcliff do not sup-
port the proposition that dictum on a federal issue triggers federal habeas review,
regardless of cause and prejudice. See id. at 477-78. For instance, in Lefkowitz v. New-
some, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), there was no procedural default. See id. at 289-90. The
Newsome Court stated its holding was "that when state law permits a defendant to plead
guilty without forfeiting his right to judicial review of specified constitutional issues, the
defendant is not foreclosed from pursuing those constitutional claims in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding." Id. at 293. The footnote in the Newsome opinion referred to by the
Ratcliff Court distinguished Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), by pointing out that there
was no bypass, deliberate or otherwise, in the Newsome case. See Newsome, 420 U.S. at
291-92 & n.9. The other case cited was Newman v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 967 (1976), in
which the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment, citing Newsome, 420 U.S.
at 292 n.9, and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 n.5 (1976). Newsome has already
been discussed. The footnote in Francis referred to by the Supreme Court says in its
entirety: "In a case where the state courts have declined to impose a waiver but have
considered the merits of the prisoner's claim, different considerations would, of course, be
applicable. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283." Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536, 542 n.5 (1976). Since the lower federal courts applied a procedural bar when the
state courts had not, the Supreme Court's holding did not allow a federal court to disre-
gard a state court's holding that no default existed when that holding forgave a proce-
dural default and went on to the merits of petitioner's federal claims. Other cases pointed
to by Ratcliff involved holdings on the merits and dictum as to procedural grounds. See
Ratcliff, 597 F.2d at 477-78. Finally, the state court in Ratcliff discussed the federal issue
in dictum, and squarely held that that claim was barred by a procedural default. See Id.
at 478. Thus, the Fifth Circuit will apply the Sykes rule when the state court discusses
the federal ground in dictum, but nonetheless holds the claim barred by a procedural
default.
The Eleventh Circuit similarly imposes the Sykes rule when the state court merely
comments in dictum on the federal claim, but holds on the procedural ground. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 777-78 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (Sykes applied despite the
state court's discussion of the merits); Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("where a state court clearly and correctly applies a procedural default rule,
Sykes requires the federal court to abide by the state court's decision even though the
state court discusses the merits as an alternate ground for rejecting a claim"), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 3591 (1984).
The Tenth Circuit similarly applies the Sykes rule despite the state court's comments in
dictum on the federal constitutional issue. See Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1363
(10th Cir. 1981). In Runnels, the state appellate court noted that the prosecutor improp-
erly directed the attention of the jury to the defendant's failure to testify, but held that the
claim was barred by a procedural default. See Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932, 937 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
Circuits holding that Sykes applies if the state court's decision was substantially based
on a procedural ground also apply Sykes when the federal constitutional discussion is
dictum. See Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131-32 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1981) (state court held
on procedural ground and its discussion of federal issue was dictum); Hockenbury v.
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sion,2 5 and, therefore, A and B are both binding precedent. Here, the
state court's decision is properly characterized an alternative holding,26
and the courts are divided as to whether Sykes applies." A third inter-
pretation is that the procedural ground A is dictum and that the federal
ground B is the sole basis of the opinion.2" Again, this is not an alterna-
tive holding because the state court's decision is interpreted as resting
only on B.29 In this case, it is generally agreed that Sykes does not
apply 30
These three possiblities assume that the federal reviewing court can
reasonably interpret the state court's opinion. Some opinions, however,
are not easily susceptible to interpretation. A classic example is the sum-
mary affirmance, in which the state court fails to give any reasons for its
decision.31 In this situation, the federal courts are again split as to
whether Sykes applies.3 2
Part I of this Note discusses the application of the Sykes cause and
prejudice test when the state court bases its decision on only one
ground-substantive or procedural-and discusses the other in dictum.
Part II examines whether the Sykes test should also apply when the state
court's holding is based on independent and adequate state procedural
grounds as well as on federal constitutional grounds-the alternative
holding. Part III discusses the inappropriateness of applying the Sykes
standard when the basis of the state court's holding is unclear.
This Note concludes that if a state court decides a claim against the
defendant on adequate and independent procedural grounds, the Sykes
cause and prejudice test should apply regardless of any further comments
by that court on the federal constitutional ground. Thus, Sykes should
apply to alternative holdings. However, when the state court forgives the
default, decides the case solely on a federal constitutional issue or fails to
clearly identify the basis of its holding, the federal habeas court should
review the state court's holding without regard to the Sykes cause and
prejudice standard.
Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1980) (state court held substantially on proce-
dural ground, but also discussed merits), cert denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
25. See United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 437, 440 (3d Cir.
1982).
26. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
28. See Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406 (1959).
29. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
31. See, eg., Memoranda, February 1980, 74 A.D.2d 738, 738-41 (162 judgments
affirmed without opinion, dated from February 4, 1980 to February 28, 1980). A sum-
mary affirmance, for the purposes of this Note, is an affirmance without opinion.
32. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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I. THE APPLICATION OF THE SYKES STANDARD WHEN THE STATE
COURT'S DECISION IS BASED ON ONLY ONE GROUND
Although two grounds for deciding an issue may exist, the state court
may choose to rely on only one. It may decide the case on an available
procedural ground, and comment in dictum on the federal issue. In con-
trast, it can choose to decide the case on the merits of the federal claim,
and comment in dictum that the claim could have been precluded by a
procedural default.
A. The Procedural Ground Is the Basis of the State Court's Decision
and Its Discussion of the Federal Issue Is Dictum
In Wainwright v. Sykes,33 the Supreme Court held that when a state
court has not resolved or ruled on a federal constitutional claim based on
a procedural default in state court, a federal court may not grant habeas
relief absent a showing of cause and prejudice.34 In light of Sykes' strict
language, the suggestion that any state court's comment on a federal is-
sue, even dictum, suffices to open federal habeas review is untenable for
several reasons.35 First, when a federal habeas court decides that the
state court's comments concerning the merits of petitioner's constitu-
tional claim are dictum, the state court has not resolved or adjudicated
the federal issue.36 Thus, Sykes properly applies.37 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state procedural defaults alone
can preclude federal review of the merits of a criminal conviction despite
the petitioner's later assertions of constitutional violations.3" Indeed, a
state court need not even discuss a constitutional claim if that claim is
"waived" or "defaulted" because of the violation of a valid procedural
rule. 9 Thus, when a state court considers the constitutional issue in dic-
tum but dismisses the claim on a state procedural ground that would bar
direct Supreme Court review, the Sykes rule should apply in full force.
Concern that state courts will "hide behind" procedural grounds to
defeat federal rights is unfounded. Not all procedural grounds constitute
adequate and independent state grounds." The resolution of this issue is
33. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
34. See id. at 86-87. See supra note 10 for a discussion of cause and prejudice.
35. In the absence of that comment, habeas review would be unavailable without a
showing of cause and prejudice. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
36. See Garvey v. Trew, 64 Ariz. 342, 350, 170 P.2d 845, 850, cert. denied, 329 U.S.
784 (1946); People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 382-83, 190 N.W. 289, 290 (1922); Winn v.
Warner, 193 S.W.2d 867, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'don other grounds, 145 Tex. 302, 197
S.W.2d 338 (1946).
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2908 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110,
124-25 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75, 86-87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 538, 542 (1976); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-52 (1965); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-29 (1963).
39. See Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1953); Herndon v. Georgia, 295
U.S. 441, 442-43 (1935); Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1948).
40. See Hill I, supra note 2, at 944-53. Examples of procedural rules that will not bar
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a federal question which a federal habeas court is competent to decide.4
If a state court denies the federal constitutional claim on an inadequate
state ground it risks having the conviction vacated on federal habeas re-
view.42 Considering the potentially overwhelming problems of retrial,4 3
a prosecutor should be loath to rely on inadequate state procedural
grounds.' Further, the Sykes rule will not bar federal review should the
petitioner show cause and prejudice.45 This exception was designed in
part to prevent miscarriages ofjustice. 4  Therefore, if the state unreason-
ably invokes a procedural rule to prevent the defendant from asserting a
constitutional claim, the federal court might properly find a miscarriage
of justice amounting to cause and prejudice.47
federal review of federal constitutional claims include a default rule that is inconsistently
applied, rules that are unconstitutional, rules that are newly created to bar the federal
claim and overly technical rules of local practice. See supra note 2.
41. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d
959, 966 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 396 (1984); Alderman v. Austin,
663 F.2d 558, 561 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 2-3 & n.1 (1st Cir.),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); In re Kravitz, 488 F. Supp. 38,45 (M.D. Pa. 1979); L
Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 144 (Cum. Supp. 1985); cf Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571,
574-75 (1948) (rule same on direct review); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S.
17, 22-23 (1920) (same).
42. See Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 966-67 & nn.10-11 (6th Cir. 1983) (asserted
procedural bar by state court that has no basis in fact or law will not bar federal review),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 396 (1984); Kozerski v. Smith, 555 F. Supp. 212, 216-18 (D.N.H.
1983) (indigent's failure to notarize motion claiming indigency due to inability to pay
notary fee is not adequate to bar federal habeas review).
43. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of these problems.
See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28
(1982); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970).
44. Cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (prosecutor may avoid using
testimony that may result in reversal on direct appeal or in federal habeas relief).
45. See id at 87. Sykes does not preclude all review of a claim merely because there
has been a procedural default. Rather, the claim may still be considered on the merits if
the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901,
2906-07 (1984). See supra note 10.
46. See id at 90-91.
47. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) ("we are confident that victims of a
fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard"); Phil-
lips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (states will not sacrifice federal constitutional
rights "because the cause and prejudice test allows for federal habeas review, despite a
procedural default, to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice"), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1287 (1984); Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining
that Fifth Circuit defines cause to protect "defendants who have not strategically with-
held constitutional objections in state court proceedings from the possibility of injus-
tice"); Hill II, supra note 10, at 1076-78 (listing factors which might guide a finding of a
miscarriage of justice). But see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982) (Sykes test is not
limited to constitutional errors which impair truthfinding-implying that cause and prej-
udice might block habeas review despite petitioner's possible innocence).
Moreover if the state court asserts a procedural default which is "an obvious subter-
fuge to evade consideration of a federal issue," this will not constitute an adequate state
ground. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945); see Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 & n.1l (1975); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 382-83, 389
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Finally, post-Sykes cases compel the conclusion that Sykes applies if
the state court dismissed the claim on adequate and independent proce-
dural grounds, although it also discussed the federal constitutional claim
in dictum. For example, in County Court v. Allen,48 although the state
court had addressed the merits of the constitutional claim,49 the Supreme
Court on habeas review nevertheless searched the record to determine
whether the state court had relied on a procedural default. 50 The Court
indicated that such a ground would have triggered the Sykes cause and
prejudice test. 5' Therefore, a state court may comment in dictum on the
merits of the constitutional claim without subjecting the conviction to
federal habeas review if its actual holding is based solely on an adequate
and independent state procedural ground.
B. The Constitutional Ground Is the Basis of the State Court's
Decision and Its Discussion of the Procedural Ground Is
Dictum
When a federal habeas court interprets a state court's holding as rest-
ing on the constitutional basis, with the consideration of the procedural
ground either reduced to dictum or the default forgiven, habeas review is
available for two reasons. First, when the state court's holding is based
solely on the merits of the federal ground, the rule of Brown v. Allen"2
entitles the petitioner to federal habeas review of his federal contention
because that claim is not barred by a procedural default.5 3
Second, as discussed earlier, the scope of direct review with respect to
adequate and independent state procedural grounds parallels the Sykes
habeas corpus rule.54 The Sykes standard applies only when an adequate
and independent state procedural ground would block direct review. 55
When a state procedural ground is not relied on or is forgiven, direct
federal review is not barred, 6 and Sykes does not apply.57
(1955). Finally, if the asserted state ground is not adequate, the Sykes bar does not apply.
See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
48. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
49. See id. at 145-46.
50. See id. at 149-54.
51. See id. at 148-49.
52. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
53. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
54. See supra note 10.
55. See supra notes 10, 41-42.
56. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1973); Beecher v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967) (per curiam); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406
(1959); International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Sur. Co., 297 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1936);
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120 (1924); Maxwell v. Sumner, 673
F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). On direct review, if the
Supreme Court reverses the state court's federal determination, the case will be remanded
to the state court for determination of the state issue. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283-
84 (1979); Indiana ex reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98, 109 (1938).
57. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549,
555 n.2 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2670 (1984); Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d
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II. THE APPLICATION OF SYKES TO ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS
BASED ON STATE PROCEDURAL AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
When a federal habeas court interprets a state court's decision as an
alternative holding based on state procedural grounds and on federal
constitutional grounds, the Sykes cause and prejudice standard should
apply" as long as the state procedural ground is adequate and independ-
ent.5 9 As a matter of procedure, most courts hold that to reverse a con-
viction based on alternative grounds, both grounds must be negated.' If
only one of the grounds is erroneous, the conviction may stand on the
other ground.61 Similarly, because a state judgment may stand on a pro-
cedural ground, the federal court must in some way overrule or disregard
that ground before it can issue a writ of habeas corpus.' Otherwise fed-
959, 966 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 396 (1984); Booker v. Wain-
wright, 703 F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 290 (1983); Bell v. Wat-
kins, 692 F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 142 (1983); United States ex
rel. Ross v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Washington v. Har-
ris, 650 F.2d 447, 452 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); Dietz v. Solem,
640 F.2d 126, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 857 & n.13
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294,
1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court has stated that when a state court does not rely on an available
state ground, the federal habeas court should not bar review on the basis of that state
ground. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 292 n.9 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 359
U.S. 394, 406 (1959).
58. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1287 (1984); United States ex rel Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1982).
59. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
60. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (if a state court decision rests
on two grounds, one of which could be reversed by the Supreme Court, the same judg-
ment will be rendered if the other ground remains as an adequate and independent state
ground); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 287-89 (1963) (state decision seemed to rest on
both merits and on procedural default, Supreme Court held procedural ground inade-
quate and reversed state court's holding on merits, reversing the conviction); cf. Restate-
ment of Judgments § 49 comment c, § 69 comment b (1942) (a civil judgment based on
alternative grounds will stand if one ground is overruled, but the other ground is left
standing).
61. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (state criminal conviction
will stand regardless of Supreme Court's disposition of the federal issue if the conviction
rests alternatively on adequate state grounds); cf Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-
89 (1969) (when appellant is sentenced to concurrent sentences, prisoner will serve one
sentence even if other is reversed); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S.
194, 196-97 (1965) (civil judgment will stand on alternative ground); Halpern v.
Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970) (same); Markoff v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 369 F. Supp. 308, 313 (D. Nev. 1973) (same), aft'd, 530 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1976);
Restatement of Judgments § 49 comment c, § 69 comment b (1942) (same); Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 comment i (1982) (same); 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 463
(1969) (same); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1038, 1045 (1945) (same).
62. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466-67 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United
States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982). See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.
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eral habeas "relief' will constitute nothing but an advisory opinion,63
and the alternative state procedural ground will not be negated. At best,
all that a federal decision would accomplish under these circumstances
would be the correction of an erroneous state view of federal law, a view
that was not essential to the state holding.
It is well settled that a federal court may not overrule a state proce-
dural holding on state law grounds.6' The federal court must therfore
negate the state ground as a matter of federal law.65 If it rules that the
state ground is not adequate and independent, it would have the discre-
tion to entertain the habeas petition.6 An alternative holding based on
federal law and inadequate state procedural grounds would then be re-
viewable without a showing of cause and prejudice. This Note assumes,
however, that the state procedural ground is adequate and independent.
The federal court could acknowledge the existence of the state proce-
dural ground but choose to "overlook" it, so that it will not block the
issuance of the federal writ.67 This was the case in Fay v. Noia,68 when
the Court held that a federal habeas court could overlook the procedural
63. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 429 (1963) (federal question would be moot or opinion would be advisory); J. No-
wak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 2, at 95 (arguing that the proper rationale for
refusing to decide the case is mootness). For discussions of advisory opinions, see gener-
ally id. at 61-64; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-10, at 56-57 (1978); C.
Wright, supra note 2, § 12, at 57-58.
64. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1975); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362
U.S. 207, 210 (1960); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1953); Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1935); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253
U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36
(1874); Breest v. Perrin, 495 F. Supp. 287, 290 & n.6 (D.N.H. 1980), aft'd, 655 F.2d I
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); C. Wright, supra note 2, § 107, at 747; Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 504 (1954).
However, the Supreme Court will review the state court disposition of the state ground
if that decision appears to be an "obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal
issue." Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945); see Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 & n. 11 (1975); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 382-83, 389
(1955); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932); Davis v. Wechsler, 263
U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
This exception is parallelled in habeas corpus by the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(8) (1982), which provide for new findings of fact if the state court's factual
determination is not fairly supported by the evidence. See id.; see also Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1981) (discussing application of § 2254(d)).
65. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 966-67 & nn.10-11 (6th Cir. 1983) (as-
serted procedural bar by state that has no support in fact or law is inadequate), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 396 (1984); Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 2 & n.1 (1st Cir.) (contempo-
raneous objection rule is adequate), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); In re Kravitz, 488
F. Supp. 38, 45 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (ordering hearing as to adequacy of state ground).
67. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 467-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Thompson
v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 11, 115-
16 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294,
1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
68. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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default unless it was intentional. 69 To the extent that Noia was willing to
ignore the state procedural ground without a separate showing of cause
and prejudice by the defendant, however, it has since been limited by
Sykes.7" A federal court may no longer overlook the procedural aspect of
an alternative holding unless it can demonstrate that Sykes was not
meant to apply to alternative holdings. In short, the federal court must
determine whether, in the case of an alternative holding, it can overlook
the procedural default without requiring the petitioner to show cause and
prejudice.
The Sykes rule can be read in two ways. A narrow interpretation is
that cause and prejudice must be shown if and only if the state court,
because of the procedural default, makes no comment on the federal con-
stitutional issue.71 Thus, Sykes would not apply whenever the state court
rules on the merits of the constitutional claim, regardless of its disposi-
tion of the procedural ground. A broader interpretation of the Sykes
rule, however, is that the cause and prejudice standard applies whenever
a state court relies on an adequate and independent state ground.7' This
interpretation would allow the state court to rule on both the federal and
state issues without exposing the conviction or the federal issue to federal
habeas review.
At first blush, the language of Sykes appears to support the narrow
interpretation. Closer analysis, however, suggests that the Court had the
broader interpretation in mind. For example, when referring to Sykes'
effect on the rule of Brown v. Allen," the Sykes Court stated that "we
deal only with contentions of federal law which were not resolved on the
merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to raise them
there as required by state procedure."'74 Arguably, this language indi-
cates that Sykes should not apply to alternative holdings. However, im-
mediately prior to this statement the Court identified the rule of Brown v.
Allen 7 5 as guaranteeing a state prisoner independent federal habeas re-
view of his federal constitutional claim irrespective of the state court in-
terpretation of that issue.7 6 The rule of Brown v. Allen thus guarantees
69. See id at 433-34. See supra note 3.
70. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-88 & n.12 (1977).
71. See Lowery v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333, 342 n.28 (5th Cir. 1983); Rogers v. McMul-
len, 673 F.2d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); Thompson
v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1981); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.2
(9th Cir. 1979).
72. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984); United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Jones
v. Jago, 701 F.2d 45, 47 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983) (when alternative holding exists, the proce-
dural ground can be a substantial basis of the decision sufficient to meet the Sixth Cir-
cuit's "substantial basis" test), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 274 (1984).
73. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
74. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (emphasis in original).
75. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
76. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. The opinion states:
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independent federal habeas review when an adequate, independent state
procedural ground does not exist to bar such review.77 It was not in-
tended to guarantee federal review simply because the state court dis-
cussed the federal issue. Indeed, Brown held explicitly that an adequate
and independent state procedural ground would bar federal habeas re-
lief.7" Thus, Sykes' discussion of Brown is properly read as reaffirming
the existence of independent federal habeas review of federal constitu-
tional claims when there exists no adequate state procedural ground bar-
ring such review. It does not limit the use of the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine in habeas corpus proceedings.
The Sykes Court also did not read Brown v. Allen79 as having been
modified by Fay v. Noia.8° Sykes stated that Brown v. Allen guaranteed
independent federal habeas review of dispositive federal issues, 8' which in
the context of Brown did not include alternative holdings when one
ground was an adequate and independent state procedural ground. 2
Under Noia,83 any federal issue, dispositive or not, guaranteed federal
habeas review absent a deliberate bypass.8 4 Moreover, Sykes explicitly
rejected the Noia rule, which allowed the federal habeas court to ignore
the state procedural ground, unless a deliberate bypass was shown. 85 It
therefore read Brown independently of Noia.
A second example of ambiguous language in Sykes is the Court's state-
ment that "the [cause and prejudice] rule will not prevent a federal
habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitu-
tional claim of a defendant." 6 One might argue this language implies
that the rule is inapplicable to review of a conviction when the state court
has adjudicated the claim, albeit in the alternative. The sentence contin-
ues, however, adding, "who in the absence of such an adjudication will
[S]ince Brown v. Allen ... it has been the rule that the federal habeas petitioner
who claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution is entitled to have the federal habeas
court make its own independent determination of his federal claim, without
being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim reached in the
state proceedings. This rule of Brown v. Allen is in no way changed by our
holding today. Rather, we deal only with contentions of federal law which were
not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to
raise them there as required by state procedure.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
77. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 82; Brown, 344 U.S. at 485-86.
78. Brown, 344 U.S. at 485-87; see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 82. In a companion case to
Brown, the petitioner was denied federal habeas review due to a procedural default.
Brown, 344 U.S. at 485-87.
79. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
80. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
81. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977).
82. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
83. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
84. See id. at 398-99, 438.
85. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
86. Id. at 91.
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be the victim of a miscarriage of justice. '8 7 An accurate rewording of
this statement is that a state prisoner who is the victim of a miscarriage
of justice will not be barred from federal habeas review despite his de-
fault. Thus, in the case of alternative holdings, the state court's holding
on procedural grounds should block federal habeas review unless the pe-
titioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or that the state's reliance
on the procedural ground results in a miscarriage of justice. The state-
ment does not indicate that the Court intended to immunize alternative
holdings from its decision; rather, it merely reaffirms that the cause and
prejudice standard is flexible enough to deal with those isolated cases in
which a miscarriage of justice might have occurred. Therefore, rather
than showing that Sykes applies only when the state court has not adjudi-
cated the federal claim, this statement is one example of the use of the
cause and prejudice standard.
Moreover, the Court has held that when a state conviction is based on
adequate and independent state grounds sufficient to bar direct federal
review, federal habeas review will be available only after a showing of
cause and prejudice. 8 An alternative holding is immune from direct fed-
eral review if it is based on adequate and independent state grounds.89 If
such a holding is sufficient to bar completely direct review, it would a
fortiori be sufficient to bar habeas review unless the Sykes test is met.
Finally, the policies emphasized by the Court in Sykes compel its ap-
plication to alternative state holdings. In Sykes and subsequent habeas
decisions, the Burger Court has emphasized the need to protect systemic
interests over and above individual liberties.9" Applying the cause and
prejudice test to alternative holdings protects these systemic interests.
Allowing free habeas review would injure them.
A major interest furthered by Sykes is respect for coordinate units of
87. Id The full text reads:
The "cause"-and-"prejudice" exception of the Francis rule will afford an ade-
quate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court
from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defend-
ant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscar-
riage of justice.
Id. at 90-91.
88. See id at 86-87. See supra note 10.
89. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll
Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278, 281 (1961); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Klinger v. Missouri,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1871). See supra note 2.
90. See, eg., Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2915 n.3 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); see also id. at 2907-08 (accuracy, efficiency and finality dictate that "in some circum-
stances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal
justice require a federal court to forgo [sic] the exercise of its habeas corpus power.")
(quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976)); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
126-28 (1982) (protection of finality, the role of trial, ability to punish offienders, federal-
ism); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977) (protection of finality, comity, role
of trial).
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the federal and state judicial systems. 91 This policy is based on comity
and is seriously undermined if Sykes is not applied to alternative hold-
ings. For instance, a federal court shows disrespect for a state rule if it is
allowed to disregard an adequate and independent state procedural rule
that is part of an alternative holding.92 In Sykes, the Supreme Court
stressed that such rules should be respected by the federal courts. 93 By
applying cause and prejudice to alternative grounds, full respect and ef-
fect are given to state procedural rules, thus promoting comity.
A second systemic policy furthered by Sykes is the promotion of final-
ity of litigation.94 Sykes forces the defense to raise all issues at trial or
risk a procedural default.95 This furthers accuracy of results at trial and
general judicial efficiency.96 Accuracy is maximized because all issues
are placed before the trier of fact, enabling it to make an informed deci-
sion.97 Applying Sykes to alternative holdings would encourage defense
counsel to contest all issues at trial, or risk losing them both on direct
appeal and habeas review.9"
In addition, if Sykes is not applied to alternative holdings, state courts
may stop writing opinions with alternative holdings. If an adequate and
independent state procedural ground exists, a state court may decide to
limit its decision solely on that ground in order to avoid federal habeas
review. 99 Placing the state courts in this dilemma violates comity be-
cause it unnecessarily discourages them from exercising their full juris-
91. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907-08 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
128 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639.40
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
92. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 467-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Phillips v.
Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984).
93. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
94. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-90. This policy has been recognized by subsequent
courts. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-
27 & n.31 (1982); Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1287 (1984); United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 441 (3d Cir.
1982); cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261-63 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (finality is furthered by cutting off all review of fourth amendment claims).
95. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-91. Subsequent courts have also recognized this effect.
See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982); Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984).
96. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127
(1982); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90.
97. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984); United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435,
442 (3d Cir. 1982).
98. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984).
99. See id. at 51; United States ex reL Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1982).
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diction"co and unjustifiably restricts their freedom in writing decisions.10'
Furthermore, because alternative holdings promote efficiency and finality
of litigation, they should be encouraged rather than discouraged.' An
alternative holding allows a lower court to resolve a case on all possible
grounds, thus providing the appellate court with findings on all possible
dispositions of the issues before it. If it turns out that one of the grounds
is erroneous, the appellate court can affirm the judgment on the alterna-
tive ground,10 3 thus promoting efficiency and finality. On the other
hand, if the alternative holding is not made, the appellate court must
remand the case to the lower court for determination of the other
ground°----a time-consuming procedure. Finally, alternative holdings
should be encouraged because they contribute to the development of the
jurisdiction's precedents and law, thus providing maximum guidance to
the lower courts.10 5
A final systemic policy asserted by the Burger Court for limiting the
exercise of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is that it deprives society of
the right to punish the guilty. 106 While it is true that the state can retry
the successful habeas petitioner, often habeas relief comes years after the
original trial. As time passes, memories fade and witnesses become diffi-
cult to locate. In such cases retrial is effectively impossible and the state
is forced to simply let the petitioner go. 10 7 The limits placed by the Bur-
ger Court on habeas review have reduced this undesirable result. 08 The
necessity of freeing guilty prisoners would be reduced even further if
Sykes is applied to alternative holdings.
In Fay v. Noia,c" the Warren Court noted several policies that support
unlimited federal habeas review of alternative holdings. These policies
did not survive the Burger Court's decision in Sykes, however, and there-
fore do not allow a federal habeas court to disregard a state procedural
100. See United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 440.
101. See Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd in part.
rev'd in part on other grounds, 733 F.2d 766 (1Ith Cir. 1984).
102. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984).
103. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
104. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 274, 283 (1979); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,
303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938).
105. Cf. Ramirez v. Jones, 683 F.2d 712, 718 (2d Cir. 1982) (Leval, J., concurring)
(state court may reach the merits despite procedural default to provide guidance to lower
courts), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983); R. Cross, supra note 19, at 41 (dictum pro-
vides guidance).
106. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
490 (1976).
107. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-
28 (1982); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 9
advisory committee note (1982) (appearing after 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)); Friendly,
supra note 43, at 146-47.
108. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 490 (1976) (possibility of freeing the guilty is a reason to bar fourth amendment
claims from federal habeas review).
109. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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holding. One of the policies advanced in Noia was that imprisonment in
violation of a petitioner's constitutional rights, whether or not properly
presented, was intolerable 1 ° A second policy was that "conventional
notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the
manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal lib-
erty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary fed-
eral judicial review."' 11I A related concern of the Warren Court was that
federal courts are better able to protect and are more receptive to the
assertion of federal rights.1 12
These policies, however, retain little vitality in the wake of Sykes and
subsequent habeas corpus cases. The Burger Court has consistently held
that procedural defaults of federal rights should be respected absent a
showing of cause and prejudice.113 Therefore, Sykes and its progeny im-
ply that it is entirely tolerable for a petitioner to be imprisoned despite
the fact that his federal claim might have produced an acquittal or a
reversal if it had been properly raised.114 Similarly, by requiring a show-
ing of cause and prejudice, the Burger Court has indicated that the policy
of affording federal review of federal claims must be balanced against the
countervailing policy of respecting valid state procedural rules.11 More-
over, the Burger Court has explicitly rejected the idea that state courts
are less able or willing to enforce federal rights.1 6 Therefore, although
applying the cause and prejudice test to alternative holdings offends the
policies of Noia, those policies have been largely replaced, if not eviscer-
ated, by Sykes.
The policies expressed by the Burger Court suggest the application of
Sykes to alternative holdings. Under Sykes, the federal habeas court may
no longer blithely overlook or overrule independent state procedural
grounds. Accordingly, it should deny habeas review unless cause and
prejudice is shown.
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCLEAR HOLDING:
SHOULD SYKES APPLY?
Unfortunately, state courts often fail to identify clearly the bases for
110. See id. at 401-02; Friendly, supra note 43, at 149-50; see also Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (approving policy advanced in Nola).
111. Noia, 372 U.S. at 424.
112. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969); Friendly, supra note
43, at 154-55. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (Burger Court
rejecting argument that federal courts are better able to and more willing to protect fed-
eral rights).
113. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2908 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
129 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
114. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 88-89 (1977).
115. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907-08 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 88 (1977).
116. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
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their decisions.' 1 7 In such a situation, should Sykes apply? Federal
courts have not answered this question uniformly.1 8 For instance, the
Second Circuit in Martinez v. Harris"9 stated that a federal habeas court
should assume that a state court's summary affirmance of a conviction
rests on the procedural ground, if the prosecutor argued procedural de-
fault to the state court, even if the constitutional claim was argued on the
merits. 20 This assumption mandates application of Sykes, which is un-
satisfactory for several reasons.1 2' First, the Court in Sykes explicitly
stated that the Brown v. Allen right to federal review of dispositive federal
constitutional issues remained undisturbed."z Under Martinez, this per-
sonal right may be sacrificed on the altar of systemic interests even when
no such interests exist or are unclear in a particular case." The Marti-
nez approach discounts the possibility that the state court's affirmance
may be on the merits of the federal grounds alone, which would entitle
the petitioner to federal habeas review under the rule of Brown v. Al-
len.124 The court's reasoning in Martinez allows a state court to block
federal habeas review by merely affirming without opinion in any case in
which the prosecution raises the issue of procedural default.'"' This is
impermissible. 126 The Sykes Court's reaftfirmance of the rule of Brown v.
Allen indicates that the Court did not intend to limit habeas review so
radically. 127
Second, the Martinez rule assumes that an adequate and independent
state procedural ground exists whenever the prosecutor argues a proce-
dural issue to the state court. 128 This approach is intolerable because, in
117. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Compare Jerome Hat Corp. v. Lou
Temco Uniforms, Inc., 74 A.D.2d 745, 745, 425 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255 (1980) (mem.) (af-
firming on the basis of the opinion below) with People v. Salerno, 74 A.D.2d 745, 745
(1980) (mem.) (affirming without opinion).
118. Compare County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-54 (1979) (searching record
and state law for procedural default) with Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1578
(1 lth Cir. 1984) (assuming procedural default when prosecutor argues merits and proce-
dure alternatively) and Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.) (same), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982) with White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1983)
(when state court record is unclear, federal courts will assume state court held on merits)
and Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 357, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1980) (same).
119. 675 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982).
120. See id. at 54.
121. See Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 849
(1982).
122. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
123. See Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 872 (2d Cir. 1985); Edwards v. Jones, 720
F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J., concurring); L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at
143 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
124. See supra note 123.
125. See Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 314 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983).
126. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (similar reasoning in direct
review) (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
127. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
128. See Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 849
(1982). As a result of Martinez, any New York prosecutor may now assert a procedural
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the event of a summary affirmance, it allows the prosecutor to defeat the
petitioner's right to federal habeas review without proving that the state
court relied on a procedural ground, and that the ground was both ade-
quate and independent.
In the recent decision of Hawkins v. LeFevre,129 the Second Circuit
expressed its dissatisfaction with the Martinez rule and its unjust re-
sults. 130 In Hawkins, the prosecutor only argued the merits and the state
appellate court affirmed the conviction without opinion.13 1 On habeas
review, the federal district court, citing Martinez, held that Hawkins was
barred from habeas review due to a procedural default. 3 2 In reversing
the district court, the Hawkins court stated that "[t]he scope of...
Martinez. . . does not extend to all factual situations and, in particular,
does not control the instant action.
133
Curiously, the panel could have reached the same result by merely
citing Washington v. Harris,134 which provides that a federal habeas
court should assume that a state court's summary affirmance of a convic-
tion rests on constitutional grounds when the prosecutor argued solely
on the merits.1 35 The Hawkins Court's criticism of the district court's
application of Martinez indicates that the Second Circuit may no longer
be willing to apply automatically Martinez whenever the prosecutor ar-
gues a procedural default to the state appellate court. Indeed the court
stated "[w]e choose not to extend Martinez and presume reliance by a
state court on a procedural default, where it appears unlikely that the
court rested its affirmance on that ground."' 36 This statement may be a
warning to state appellate courts to clearly identify the bases of their
holdings, or risk federal habeas review. 137 Indeed, the court cited with
approval Judge Newman's concern about the Martinez rule:
What concerns me about the majority's inference from state court si-
lent affirmance is the prospect that in some future case where a proce-
dural default is arguable, but not clear, the [state appellate court] will
silently affirm after deciding that there was neither procedural default
ground for affirmance in the State's brief to the Appellate Division in order to block
federal habeas review. However, the prosecutor's procedural argument may not be accu-
rate. See, e.g., County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148 & n.6 (1979); Henry v. Wain-
wright, 686 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223
(1983).
129. 758 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1985).
130. See id. at 872-73.
131. See id. at 870 & n.6. "The Queens County District Attorney seemingly conceded
that the trial judge's actions amounted to a constitutional violation, but argued that such
error was harmless." Id. at 870.
132. See id. at 870.
133. See id. at 871.
134. 650 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982).
135. See id. at 451-52.
136. Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 874 (2d Cir. 1985).
137. See id. at 872 & n.8 ("[w]e continue to urge the state courts to remove the ambi-
guity in their summary affirmances by indicating, with citation to [the state rules of crimi-
nal procedure] ..... their reliance on procedural default") (citation omitted).
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nor a valid claim on the merits, and we will then affirm the denial of
habeas corpus relief because we mistakenly presume state court reli-
ance on procedural default even though we think a constitutional error
affecting substantial rights has occurred.1
3 8
In the past, the Supreme Court has attempted to solve the problem
presented by unclear state opinions by searching the state court
records-appellate and trial-to determine whether the state courts re-
lied on a state procedural ground.'19 The major problem with this ap-
proach is that it is time-consuming t ' and therefore inefficient. This is a
significant problem because one of the primary purposes of limiting
habeas-relieving the burden on the lower federal courts14 '-is under-
mined by requiring federal habeas courts to search the trial and appellate
records every time a state court fails to state clearly the basis of its
holding.
138. Id. at 872 (quoting Edwards v. Jones, 750 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman,
J., concurring)).
139. See, e.g., County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147 n.5, 152 (1979); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 74-75, 85-86 (1977); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 402-04 (1959).
Some circuits have also applied this method. See, eg., Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113,
116 (5th Cir. 1983); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
140. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1212 (1983).
141. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring.); Friendly,
supra note 43, at 143-5 1; Federal Habeas Corpus Review, supra note 3, at 863 & nn.68-69.
It is correctly pointed out that Sykes may not effectively relieve the burden of the lower
federal courts. See id. at 863 n.69. The Sykes rule may be an attempt by the Court to
retain the supervisory role of the federal courts, while responding to the concerns ex-
pressed by Justice Jackson in Brown, 344 U.S. at 537-41 (Jackson, J., concurring). In that
case he wrote:
[T]his Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ until floods of
stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions innundate the docket of the lower
courts and swell our own. Judged by our own disposition of habeas corpus
matters, they have, as a class, become peculiarly undeserving. It must prejudice
the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.
He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude
that the needle is not worth the search ...
It cannot be denied that the trend of our decisions is to abandon rules of
pleading or procedure which would protect the writ against abuse.
. . . It really has become necessary to plead nothing more than that the pris-
oner is in jail, wants to get out, and thinks it is illegal to hold him. If he fails, he
may make the same plea over and over again.
Since the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it are the supreme law and
since the supremacy and uniformity of federal law are attainable only by a cen-
tralized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed federal right must
give some access to the federal judicial system. But federal interference with
state administration of its criminal law should not be premature and should not
occur where it is not needed.
Id. at 536-41 (footnotes omitted). However, when the petitioner's claim falls short of a
miscarriage of justice and he cannot show good cause for his default, then his pleas,
meritorious or frivolous, will not be heard. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91(1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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A second problem is that ad hoc federal determinations of the basis of
state court decisions injure the policy of comity, a doctrine which re-
quires predictable interaction 42 between state and federal courts. State
courts should know how federal habeas courts will react to their deci-
sions.14 3 This is impossible if a case-by-case, rule of interpretation is
adopted. 144
Finally, this approach is of limited use because it can lead to inaccu-
rate results. 145 For example, if a state appellate court issues an affirm-
ance without opinion, 146 it is impossible to determine which of several
grounds asserted by the prosecution forms the basis of the appellate
court's decision. Moreover, a search of the trial court record-always a
time-consuming process-will be unavailing in many cases because trial
courts often fail to address the issue either as a matter of procedure or on
the merits.147 Thus, the first state court to face the issue may be an ap-
pellate court or a state habeas court.148 All of these reasons point to the
inaccuracy inherent in this approach. Inaccurate results are intolerable
when an individual's liberty is at stake. 149 In addition, such inaccuracies
thwart the policy of comity"5 ° which the Burger Court has so zealously
guarded.' 51
A third approach to the problem of unclear state holdings-one which
avoids unduly burdening the federal courts-is for the federal habeas
court to assume that the state appellate court relied on federal law when-
ever the basis of the state court's opinion is unclear. 152 This would pro-
142. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
143. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
144. See id.
145. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1983); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 359
U.S. 394, 403 (1959) (lower federal courts erred in construing the state court opinion as
resting on state grounds).
146. See supra note 117.
147. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263 & n.19 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring); see, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1977); Phillips v. Smith, 717
F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984); Thompson v. Estelle, 642
F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1981).
148. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 541-42 (1981) (state appellate court); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977) (state habeas appeal); Martinez v. Harris, 675
F.2d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir.) (state appellate court), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982); Wash-
ington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1981) (state appellate court), cert, denied,
455 U.S. 951 (1982); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir, 1980) (state
appellate court), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113, 114-
15 (5th Cir. 1983) (appeal to state appellate court from denial of state habeas petition).
149. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2), (3), (6), (8) (1982). One of the policies of Sykes is to promote accuracy of
results at trial. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. It would be ironic if the
accuracy promoted by the Sykes limit on habeas review was then subverted by the appli-
cation of Sykes by the federal habeas courts to murky state court determinations.
150. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-41 (1983).
151. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
152. See White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1983) (assuming state court held
on the merits); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 359 & n.6, 360 (4th Cir. 1980)
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tect the petitioner's right under Brown v. Allen153 to federal review, while
avoiding undue burden on the lower federal courts."4 This approach
would also produce consistent results by avoiding ad hoc interpretations
of state court opinions. 5 5 Finally, this method is supported by the
Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long.1 56
In Long, the Court on direct review confronted the problem of deter-
mining the basis of a state court's holding.1" 7 One basis for the state
court's holding could have been an adequate and independent state
ground, but the other could have been federal.' The Supreme Court
held that review is not barred unless the state court includes "a 'plain
statement' that a decision rests upon adequate and independent state
grounds.""' This rule assumes that there are no adequate and independ-
ent state grounds "when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the
state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and
when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on
federal law."" ° Long held that when it is not clear that adequate and
independent state grounds support the judgment, the Supreme Court on
direct appeal will assume that none exist.' 6 ' Federal habeas courts
should assume the same.
Arguably, applying the plain statement rule to state court opinions in
the context of habeas review would allow the prisoner to obtain habeas
review any time he merely asserted a federal claim. This argument is
unpersuasive because it ignores the fact that if a valid state procedural
ground exists and the state court's opinion clearly rests on that ground,
the petitioner cannot secure habeas review by asserting a federal issue.' 62
Requiring state courts to make a plain statement is a slight burden con-
sidering the prisoner's interest in securing federal habeas review.1 63 A
plain statement may be cursory; it does not require an in-depth written
analysis.' Thus, the compromise of the state interest is slight in com-
(same); L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 142-43 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (federal habeas court
should assume state court held on merits).
153. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
154. See supra notes 140-41, infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
155. L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985). See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
156. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
157. See id. at 1037.
158. See id. The state court could have held on either state constitutional grounds or
federal constitutional grounds on the issue of whether a search of defendant's car was
illegal. Id. at 1043-44.
159. Id. at 1042.
160. Id. (footnote omitted).
161. See id.
162. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985). See supra notes 33-
51, 58-116 and accompanying text.
163. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985); cf. Smith v. Digmon,
434 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1978) (exhaustion requirement is satisfied if petitioner raises the
claim in state court, regardless of whether the state court passes on it).
164. See Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 872 (2d Cir. 1985); Edwards v. Jones, 720
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parison to the total compromise of the prisoner's rights if another rule
were adopted. 16
5
Moreover, the state court is the controlling actor in this scenario. It
has complete control over the content of its opinion, 166 and the content
determines whether the Sykes cause and prejudice standard applies.1 67
Therefore, the state court, by drafting an opinion with a plain statement,
can determine whether federal habeas review will be freely given; the
prisoner does not have that control. If the state court does not clearly
indicate the basis for its holding, the doubt should be resolved against the
state-the controlling actor-and Sykes should not apply.' 68
Finally, applying Long's plain statement rule to habeas review does not
unduly offend the systemic policies of Sykes. Under the plain statement
rule the policies of finality and efficiency would be harmed only when the
basis of the state court's opinion is ambiguous. 169 When a state court
clearly indicates that its decision is based on adequate and independent
state grounds, federal review would be unavailable absent a demonstra-
F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J., concurring); Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d
311, 314 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983); L. Yackle,
supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985); cf County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
153-54 (1979) (state court passed on merits of federal constitutional claim, despite brevity
of its discussion of that issue); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.) (assuming
procedural ground when no reasoning given), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982).
165. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
166. See id.
167. If the rationale is solely federal, then Sykes does not apply. See supra notes 52-57
and accompanying text. If the decision is based alternatively on federal and state
grounds, Sykes should apply, though some circuits do not apply Sykes in this case. See
supra notes 15-17, 58-116 and accompanying text. If the state ground is the sole basis,
then Sykes applies. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
168. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985); cf Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (direct review of state court conviction). The Supreme
Court in the context of direct review has stated:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpret-
ing their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or ob-
scure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination
by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intel-
ligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of
the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. . . . For no
other course assures that important federal issues. . . will reach this Court for
adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues
under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the constitu-
tional jurisdiction of the states.
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940). In National Tea the Supreme
Court vacated a state court judgment and remanded for a clarification of the basis of that
court's decision. See id. at 556-57. A federal habeas court should not, however, employ
that procedure. Vacating every state conviction in which the state court's reasoning was
not clear would be contrary to the policy of comity. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 467-
68 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The problem is more easily solved by requiring a plain
statement.
169. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).
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tion of cause and prejudice.170 Further, to avoid federal habeas review, a
state court need only briefly state in its opinion the adequate and in-
dependent state grounds. 17 ' Although it can be argued that placing re-
quirements on the drafting of state courts' opinions offends comity, in
these circumstances the offense is minimal. In the case of an unclear
holding, the state court is asked to say more. It is not constrained from
discussing federal law. Thus, applying Long to unclear holdings would
not offend comity to the same extent that not applying Sykes to alterna-
tive holdings would.'72
In Long, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of the plain statement
rule on comity. First, the Court emphasized the problems presented
when a reviewing court determines ad hoc whether a decision was based
on adequate and independent state grounds.173 The Court viewed that
method as "antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required
when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved."'" The
Court then stated that the plain statement approach "provide[s] state
judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unim-
peded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of fed-
eral law. . . . '[It is important] that ambiguous or obscure adjudications
by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by [the
Supreme Court] of the validity under the federal constitution of state
action.' "'171 Thus the Court indicated that the plain statement rule
might actually promote rather than offend comity.
Because the alternatives to applying the plain statement rule to habeas
corpus review are to accept ad hoc determinations by reviewing courts 176
or to assume that the claim is procedurally barred,'" any injury to com-
ity arising from applying Long to unclear state holdings is tolerable. 78
Although more friction may arise from applying Long in the habeas con-
text than on direct review, this merely reflects the fact that habeas review
by its very nature creates friction between federal and state courts. 7 9
Further, applying Long to unclear holdings furthers Brown v. Allen's pro-
tection of state prisoners against violations of their federal rights by the
states.8 ° Finally, although applying Long to habeas review may cor-
170. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; cf Long, 463 U.S. at 1043-44 (rule
applied in context of direct review).
171. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
173. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1041 (quoting Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
176. See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
178. See L. Yackle, supra note 3, § 84, at 143 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
179. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 & n.33 (1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539, 550 (1981); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1982); 17 C. Wright,
A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4261, at 600 (1978).
180. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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promise comity slightly, it also furthers comity since it is a consistent and
predictable approach.
CONCLUSION
The Sykes cause and prejudice standard should be applied whenever a
state court, solely or alternatively, relies on a procedural ground that
constitutes an adequate and independent state ground. If the state court
does not rely on a state ground, free habeas review as guaranteed by
Brown v. Allen should be granted. When the basis of the state conviction
is unclear, the federal court should apply the plain statement rule estab-
lished by the Court in Michigan v. Long. When it is not clear that ade-
quate and independent state grounds support the conviction, the federal
habeas court should assume none exist and therefore grant habeas
review.
These rules further the systemic policies enunciated by the Court in
Sykes. Although applying Long to habeas review might slightly increase
federal-state friction, this is tolerable. If Long is not applied to unclear
holdings, the alternatives are to accept ad hoe determinations by review-
ing courts, which can lead to even greater friction between the two court
systems, or risk sacrificing the state prisoner's right to federal adjudica-
tion of his federal claim even though that claim is not barred by an ade-
quate and independent state procedural ground.
James W. Dobbins
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